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Abstract 
In the first half of this year, China’s GDP grew 7.6% (7.5% in the second quarter), industrial 
value added rose 9.3% and the CPI climbed 2.4% (2.7% in June), continuing the steady 
growth at a slightly decelerated pace. This is positive, because it has made space for the 
economic slowdown and restructuring. While liquidity was generally sufficient, China 
experienced a ‘money shortage’ as a result of the maturity mismatch and idling of bank assets 
and liabilities. The central bank aptly refused to ‘ease’ monetary policy, which was conducive 
to securing long-term financial stability and economic growth at the expense of short-term 
market fluctuations.  
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1. Overview of the Economy  
In the first half of this year, China’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew 7.6% (7.5% in the 
second quarter), industrial value added rose 9.3% and the consumer price index (CPI) 
climbed 2.4% (2.7% in June), continuing China’s steady growth at a slightly decelerated 
pace. Although this contradicted what was expected by some scholars, it tied in with the 
shrinking growth potential of the Chinese economy and accommodated the needs of the 
country’s economic transition. This was positive, because it made space for the economic 
slowdown and restructuring. 
 
FIGURE 1: GDP, Industrial Value Added and CPI Growth (in %) 
 
 
It is undeniable that the Chinese economy has already slowed. Consequently, people are 
starting to look for the bottom. To this end, we compare previous economic declines over the 
past 15 years to this economic slowdown. The Asian financial crisis triggered the first 
meltdown. As a result, the Chinese economy grew 8.8%, 7.8%, 7.1% and 8.0% respectively 
in the years 1997–2000. The international financial crisis spawned the second drop. 
Consequently, the growth rate of the Chinese economy reached 9% in the third quarter of 
2008, fell to 6.8% in the fourth quarter, 6.1% in the first quarter of 2009 and then rose to 
7.9% in the second quarter. The ongoing deceleration has led to the third fall in the economic 
growth rate, which plummeted from a high of 11.9% in the first quarter of 2010 to 7.6% in 
the second quarter of 2012. Since then, the growth rate has lingered between 7.4% and 7.9%. 
Many scholars argue that the bottom will be 7%. However, this conclusion merits some 
debate because the growth rate remained below 7% in two consecutive quarters and even 
dropped to 6.1%.  
Moreover, the triggers for these declines were different. The first two declines resulted 
from short-term adjustments in response to the impacts of the Asian and international 
financial crises. The ongoing decline, stemming from economic internalities and trends, is 
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fuelled by mid-term and long-term economic restructuring. So it is highly inappropriate to 
ascribe this slowdown to the impact of the ongoing international financial crisis and the 
withdrawal of incentive policies. Instead, it implies the return to rapid growth rather than the 
beginning of mild growth. There are three anticipated bottoms for the decline: 7% for the 
12th Five-Year-Plan period, 7.5% for this year and 7.3% in order to quadruple China’s GDP. 
The anticipated bottom of 7.5% may apply to this year, but won’t necessarily fit for the mid- 
and long-term scenarios. 
The state of the economy was highlighted by the decline in the rate of growth of three 
demands. First, investment in fixed assets grew 20.1%, down 0.3 of a percentage point over 
the same period last year, and its contribution to GDP growth reached 53.9%. This proves 
that the Chinese economy is still driven mainly by investment, and it has to be fuelled by 
investment. To break it down, investment in the real estate sector climbed 20.3%, up 3.7 
percentage points year-on-year. The top bidders for land for construction were frequently 
reported across China against the backdrop of five measures adopted by the State Council 
earlier this year to regulate the property market.1 This signifies that these measures have 
failed to produce the desired effect and foreshadows the investment trend in the property 
market. In recent months, many local governments have unveiled their investment plans, the 
value of which totalled more than RMB 20 trillion. Among them, Sichuan Province plans to 
invest 4.3 trillion, Guizhou 1.7 trillion and Guangxi 1.5 trillion. On 16 May, the General 
Office of the State Council issued an official document detailing 117 reforms of the 
bureaucratic process and issued a list of 104 items, most of which are related to investment 
and operational activities in key economic sectors and investment by enterprises in civil 
airports and urban rail transport projects. At the central level, this could streamline the 
approval process, but locally it may exacerbate the ongoing capital-spending spree. 
The second decline relates to retail sales of consumer goods, which gained 12.7%, down 
1.7 percentage points year-on-year and contributes 45.2% to the GDP. Although this is 
partially caused by the decline in consumption of luxury dinners after the central government 
issued restrictive policies cutting back on spending by officials,2 we still have to keep an eye 
on income and employment.  
In the first half of this year, the income of urban residents increased 6.5% and the cash 
income of rural residents rose 9.2%, both of which represented a fall of 3.2 percentage points 
over of the same period last year. It should be noted that income serves as the foundation of 
consumption and is in inverse proportion to the savings rate. Should the savings rate remain 
unchanged, and if income declines, consumption will fall. In addition to the increase in 
income, expectation is also an important factor influencing consumption. Currently, while the 
income increase is slowing, expenses, including payment for housemaid services, private 
teaching and driving lessons are all rising, resulting in an accelerated growth in the CPI. 
Naturally, the anticipation of a slowing in the increase of income along with rising expenses 
                                                        
1 See http://english.cntv.cn/program/china24/20130221/106944.shtml, accessed 8 September 2013. 
 
2 See http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1119384/xi-jinpings-guidelines-cut-back-extravagance-go-
effect, accessed 8 September 2013. 
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isn’t desirable. Consequently, people are showing cautious consumption behaviour, 
demonstrated by the fact that the balance of individual savings totalled over RMB 100 trillion 
at the end of June (RMB 100.91 trillion). 
Consumption is related to income, and further related to employment. Though 
employment influences economic growth through income and consumption, it is also a basic 
factor in economic growth. China has yet to provide reliable and comprehensive statistics on 
employment or unemployment, making the macroeconomic analysis incomplete. In the first 
half of this year, 7.32 million new jobs were created in urban areas, up 0.38 million over the 
same period last year. Accordingly, the slowdown of economic growth will increase 
unemployment. This is demonstrated by the difficulty that college graduates have in finding 
jobs. The Report on Employment of College Students in China 2013 interviewed college 
students between 29 October 2012 and 10 April 2013. The report revealed that of college 
students with an associate, bachelor and master’s degree, the numbers that signed an 
employment contract were respectively 13, 12 and 11 percentage points lower than the same 
period the previous year. By the middle of May, 38.9% of the college graduates in Shanghai 
had not found a job; those figures showed employment of graduates down 16.7 percentage 
points over the same period last year. In contrast, 100% of students from some vocational 
schools signed an employment contract even before their graduation.  
While college graduates have difficulty finding jobs, employers find it harder to recruit 
desired employees. A structural imbalance is caused by the mismatch between supply and 
demand, which gives rise to the competition between college graduates and migrant workers 
in the labour market. According to the Report on Employment of College Students in China 
2013, the average expected monthly salary of college graduates is RMB 3,683.6 this year, 
nearly RMB 2,000 lower than the equivalent in 2011, which was RMB 5,537.5. According to 
data released by the National Bureau of Statistics, the average monthly salary of migrant 
workers reached RMB 2,290 in 2012. A survey by MyCOS, an educational consultancy 
service provider, shows that the average starting salary of 69% of college graduates with a 
bachelor’s degree is less than RMB 2,000 per month this year. This indicates the high 
investment, low output and structural imbalance of college education, which leads to the 
surplus of college students. Moreover, the proportion of college graduates that can find jobs 
matching their college education is only 15% in China (compared to 60% in Germany), 
giving rise to psychological pressure on college students. They can’t pay back education 
loans, get married in their thirties, or afford to buy a small apartment with the money they 
save for many years, painting a picture of faint hope for the future. This poses a major threat 
to social stability. 
The third decline in demand, and what is most surprising in the economic operation in 
the first half of this year, is the rise and fall of foreign trade. In the first quarter, imports and 
exports rose 8.4% and 18.4% respectively. Then their growth significantly slowed in the 
second quarter before registering a negative growth of -0.7% and -3.1% in June. One of the 
reasons is that the statistics were falsified earlier and the bubble in the statistics was squeezed 
out later to present the real picture. For example, in the first four months, exports to Hong 
Kong totalled US$ 150.59 billion, up 66%. The trade between Shenzhen and Hong Kong rose 
130%. The daily exports of the Shenzhen Futian Bonded Zone statistically reached US$ 1.17 
billion in the first half of April. But in May, after the false trade was checked, daily exports 
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dropped to US$ 170 million, down 83.8%. In this case, the data, which indicates that imports 
and exports rose 6.7% and 10.4% respectively in the first half of this year, is unreliable. The 
real GDP growth rate in the first half of this year is less than 7.6%.  
Why is false trade so rampant? Like the ‘one-day trip to Hong Kong’, goods travel back 
and forth between the two destinations for profit mainly because of the policy adopted by 
banks to offer credit secured by standby letters of credit from branches in China. The process 
is as follows: a Chinese company deposits some money into a bank and asks the bank to issue 
an equivalent letter of credit. Then, an overseas subsidiary of the company buys the goods, to 
which the letter of credit will be sent. Next, the overseas subsidiary presents the letter of 
credit to a foreign bank. The roundtrip trade leverages the difference in interest rates between 
two places for arbitrage. The RMB-denominated loan interest rate is about 2.25–2.50% in 
Hong Kong, and 3.25–3.30% in the Chinese mainland, a gap of nearly 1%. Moreover, 
Chinese companies can buy wealth management products whose annual yield is 4.3% as a 
pledge, further expanding the interest rate gap. If the payment is made in USD and receipt is 
made in RMB, the gap in the interest rate would be 0.48%. If the principal is RMB 100 
million, 100 roundtrips will secure RMB 10 billion for a profit of RMB 248 million. This is 
the secret to the sharp change in trade statistics.  
The decline in export growth has several other causes. First, overseas market demand 
remains sluggish. According to customs statistics, since the beginning of this year, export 
orders declined 45% each month. In the first half of this year, China’s trade to Japan fell 9.3% 
and its trade to Europe dropped 3.1%. Second, the appreciation of the RMB resulted in 
increasing wages for the Chinese and rising export costs. At the end of May, the real effective 
exchange rate (REER) index of RMB stood at 116.3, up 5.6% from the end of last year. 
According to the survey of the Ministry of Commerce, over 73% of the companies surveyed 
think that the appreciation of the exchange rate is the main factor that affects exports. Third, 
trade frictions diversified. In the first quarter, 12 countries launched a total of 22 trade 
remedy investigations, which severely affected China’s export of advantageous products. 
Fourth, China’s economic growth decelerated and the profitability of sectors with surplus 
capacity restrained the import of raw materials. These factors are likely to persist in the short 
term. Therefore, the export situation will remain harsh in the second half of this year, so we 
should prepare for a slide or even recession. 
 
2. ‘Money Shortage’ and Monetary Policy 
A money shortage and a subsequent break in cash flows was a significant event this quarter, 
which began on 6 June and reached a climax on 20 June, creating a minor crisis and 
foreshadowing the transition towards market liquidity. 
     On 6 June, the size of the bond issued by the Agricultural Development Bank of China 
was scaled back due to insufficient subscription. Then there emerged a rumour in the market 
that the fund position of two shareholding banks showed a warning indicator. On 7 June, the 
central bank cancelled the Short-term Liquidity Operation (SLO). Around 16:30 the same 
day, two state-owned banks started to borrow money in the market. On the following day, the 
overnight Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (Shibor) skyrocketed to 9.5810%. The situation 
remained unchanged around time of the Dragon Boat Festival (12 June). The overnight, 14-
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day, 1-month and 3-month rates increased 20.70, 73.10, 50.90 and 24.80 basis points 
respectively. Against this backdrop, the central bank changed its previous practice of keeping 
the rates in check, standing by and refusing to ease the monetary policy. 
The interbank market experienced a ‘strong earthquake’ on 20 June when the interest 
rates soared and bonds fell sharply. When the early morning trading started, all the banks 
tried to secure funds at an interest rate of higher than 10%. During the day, the overnight 
Shibor rate rose to 13.44% and reached 18% at noon. The 7-day pledged repo rate reached its 
highest level, at 28%. The whole monetary market registered a break in the cash flow. 
Despite this, the central bank still refused to ease the monetary policy. Financial institutions 
came to realize almost overnight that the central bank would eventually stop reaching out 
with a helping hand. 
After issuing a letter on administrating the liquidity of commercial banks on 24 June, the 
central bank issued a press release titled Reasonably Regulate Liquidity to Safeguard Stability 
of the Monetary Market on the evening of 25 June, indicating that the liquidity was generally 
sufficient and that the seasonal interest rate fluctuations in the monetary market were only 
temporary. Moreover, heads of the People’s Bank of China (the central bank), the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission gathered at a press release at the Lujiazui Forum in 
response to market concerns on liquidity. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC), Bank of Communications and Minsheng Bank all indicated that the liquidity was 
currently normal. Afterwards, interbank interest rates fell significantly. On the same day, the 
weighted overnight pledged repo rate closed at 5.8270%, down 81.91 basis points. The 
Shibor rate fell to below 5% on June 28, and further to 3.786% on July 2. The ‘money 
shortage’ came to a soft landing. 
Superficially, the ‘money shortage’ was caused by the supplementary payment of 
statutory deposit reserves, uniform payment of taxes to the state treasury at the end of June, 
adoption of prudent monetary policy by the central bank and the refusal to ease liquidity, and 
anticipated tightening caused by the planned ending of quantitative easing (QE) by the US 
Federal Reserve. Some hot money flew out, leading to a reduction in base money. As a matter 
of fact, the fundamental reason is the maturity mismatch and idling of bank assets and 
liabilities and the imbalanced financial structure behind it. The reality is that there is enough 
money, but it is misplaced.  
In the first five months of this year, RMB 9.11 trillion in total was raised, up 3.12 trillion 
over the same period of the previous year. The supply of broad money (M2) reached RMB 
104 trillion. In five years, the ratio of credit to GDP jumped from 75% to 200%. Fitch 
Ratings warned that ‘the scale of credit in China was so extreme that the country would find 
it very hard to grow its way out of the excesses as in past episodes, implying tougher times 
ahead’.3 In spite of sufficient liquidity, banks suffer ‘money shortages’, and so did the real 
economy. This is because many banks, trusts and other financial institutions borrow short-
term money to make long-term investments and make leverage investments in real estate, 
local debts and private debts for huge profits. Financial innovation and development of off-
                                                        
3 See http://www.businessinsider.com/fitch-chinas-credit-bubble-is-a-record-2013-6, accessed 8 September 
2013. 
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balance sheet business make it more convenient for banks to engage in such high-risk 
investments. Outside the banking system, shadow banks are expanding wildly. Wealth 
management products worth RMB 2 trillion of lending are in reality a ‘hidden second balance 
sheet’ for banks, allowing them to circumvent loan curbs and dodge efforts by regulators to 
halt the excesses. This gives rise to an interesting phenomenon: ‘water on one side and fire on 
the other’, i.e. the more the monetary policy is eased, the more difficult it is for emerging 
sectors and small and medium-sized enterprises to raise funds. The mismatch and idling of 
funds is deemed by many people as a ‘cancer’ in the Chinese economy. The excess liquidity 
nurtures the ‘cancer’. Once the ‘cancer’ deteriorates, the consequences will be unimaginable.  
On this basis, we think that it is appropriate for the central bank to refuse to ease the 
monetary policy and that the central bank should maintain its stance. This indicates that both 
the central bank and the top-level decision makers are proactively piercing the bubble to 
redirect money into the real economy, lowering the leverage of local governments, banks and 
other financial institutions and securing long-term financial stability and economic growth at 
the expense of short-term market fluctuations.  
While the ‘money shortage’ was at its height, on 19 June the executive meeting of the 
State Council addressed the issue. On 5 July, the General Office of the State Council issued 
the Guidance on Financial Support in Economic Restructuring and Upgrading (hereafter 
referred to as the ‘Guidance’). The central idea is to ‘revitalize the stock’ and to make ‘good 
use of incremental capital’. The former includes 10 measures and the latter focuses on eight 
key sectors.  
The meaning of making good use of incremental capital is quite clear, i.e. new loans 
should be directed to eight key sectors displaying higher efficiency, mainly new sectors, small 
and medium-sized enterprises, the service sector, transition, upgrading and restructuring. This 
calls for the support of effective preferential policies.  
Revitalizing the stock consists of liquidizing the money stock and fiscal funds. The 
former includes savings of residents, because funds used by enterprises mainly come from 
bank loans. The money flows out of banks into enterprises and then back into the hands of 
residents. As the savings rate is higher, residents save some money at banks; that money 
becomes sedimentary. Currently, the balance of resident savings exceeds RMB 100 trillion. 
Fiscal funds include treasury deposits. According to the balance sheet of the central bank, at 
the end of May, the balance of government deposits in the central bank was over RMB 3 
trillion, up more than 10 times over 2000. 
To revitalize the stock, we must resort to financial innovation. There are two specific 
measures. First, to allow banks to issue financial bonds and residents to buy bank bonds. As a 
result, such money will flow into banks as ‘circulating money’, and banks won’t need to ask 
the central bank for money. If financial bonds have high credit ratings and long terms, it can 
lower the investment risks for residents and improve the maturity mismatch of assets and 
liabilities for banks. Second, to securitize assets, i.e. securitize credit assets and corporate 
assets. For instance, securitized loans can be sold to residents to increase their assets. As a 
result, bank assets can be revitalized and the money supply can be reduced. China started to 
launch pilot assets securitization in 2005. At present, securitized assets total RMB 100 billion, 
which is too small in size and slow in expanding. Assets securitization facilitates the 
Zhang Shuguang and Zhang Chi 
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development of capital markets, increases the efficiency of the financial system and enables 
finance to better serve the real economy. This constitutes a new opportunity for the growth of 
the Chinese economy and provides a sound way to address the rapid expansion of shadow 
banks.  
In the Guidance, it is reiterated that private funds should be allowed to establish private 
banks, financial leasing companies and consumer finance companies on a trial basis. If this 
proposal is well implemented, it would mark an important step forward to break the existing 
financial monopoly and help address the difficulty of small and medium-sized companies in 
raising funds. Also, private banks have experienced some rises and falls and only Minsheng 
Bank manages to survive. From the initial practice of launching a regional pilot, summarizing 
the experience and then implementing it nationwide, to the current practice of carrying out 
plans directly, top-level decision makers seem to have adjusted their approach to financial 
innovation. Hopefully, they won’t let people down again. If they really want to develop 
private banks, it is advisable to be more aggressive by approving several hundred banks so 
that there are around 10 banks in each province. On top of that, relevant systems should be 
established and strictly followed, including a deposit insurance system and deposit entry and 
withdrawal systems. Take the capital adequacy ratio as example. It should be no less than 8%. 
If it is less than 7%, a warning should be sent. If it is less than 5%, the bank must correct the 
problem. If it is less than 3%, the bank should be liquidated and ordered to withdraw from the 
market. 
 
3. Forecast 
The current international economic situation can be briefly described as ‘robust growth in the 
USA, weak growth in Europe, improvement in Japan and a slowdown in emerging 
economies’. 
The US economy grew 1.8% in the first quarter and slightly higher in the second quarter. 
Although the growth rate is lower than anticipated, some key economic indicators, including 
the unemployment rate, construction of new houses, the sale of existing houses and consumer 
confidence, are improving. The real economy is starting to stabilize. So, after three rounds of 
QE policies, it is more likely that QE will end. In late May, the US Federal Reserve implied 
that it might slash bond purchases. On 19 June, the Fed chairman Ben Bernanke indicated 
that if economic indicators met with expectations in the future, the Federal Reserve would 
reduce the purchases of QE3 this year, continue to cut purchases in the first half of next year 
and completely end it in the middle of next year. The unemployment rate is the key indicator. 
The US unemployment rate dropped to 7.5% in April and 7.6% in May from a high of 9.7% 
during the financial crisis. So, it is likely to fall to 7%. 
In contrast, the European economy is still haunted by the debt crisis and an imbalance in 
growth in the Euro zone. Economic growth dropped for four consecutive quarters, registering 
a contraction of 0.2% in the first quarter over the last quarter of 2012. Germany is faring 
better than peripheral countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal, which are plagued by 
problems that are proving hard to resolve. Core countries including France and Italy are also 
to the brink of recession again. Industrial production in Italy has dropped 25% from the 
highest level in history, and unemployment, particularly unemployment among young people, 
is quite high. According to statistics released on 1 July, over a quarter of job hunters under the 
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age of 25 in the European Union can’t find a job. This rate is up to 59.2% in Greece and 
56.5% in Spain. These young people are well educated and have a bachelor or master’s 
degree. If this scenario continues, it will lead to falling birth rates, exacerbated social unrest 
and rampant political extremism.  
Stimulated by ‘Abeconomics’ and the policy of unlimited monetary easing, the 
momentum of the Japanese economy picked up somewhat in the first half of this year. 
However, whether this is sustainable is uncertain. 
Due to the impact of the staggering world economy and internal restructuring, the growth 
of emerging economies is starting to slow. Except for China, which still maintains a growth 
rate of 7%, Brazil, India and Russia present a situation that brooks no optimism. In particular, 
because of the anticipated end of QE3 by the US Federal Reserve, the international capital 
flow may change and these countries may experience an outflow of capital.  
In a nutshell, the world economy is confronted with an array of challenges and risks 
arising from interweaving new and old patterns and the ongoing transition from the old to the 
new, which renders the future highly volatile. As a result, the International Monetary Fund 
has lowered its forecast of world economic growth for this year and the next. 
The Chinese economy is currently transiting from rapid growth to moderate and slow 
expansion, posing a huge downward pressure. In June, the manufacturing PMI (Purchasing 
Managers Index) stood at 50.1%, close to the 50% demarcation line and down 0.7 of a 
percentage point over the previous month, which marked the lowest level in four months. 
This indicates that the Chinese economy is still stabilizing and the manufacturing sector 
remains sluggish. Plus, the fall of the PPI (producer price index) is likely to continue. 
Consequently, the economic indicators will continue to fall in the second half of this year. 
Even if the economy grows at a rate lower than 7.5%, it is still a remarkable achievement. 
Accordingly, we forecast the economy to operate as follows in the third quarter and the 
whole year (Table 1): 
 
TABLE 1: Economic Forecast for the 3rd Quarter and the Year 2013 
Quarter 
 
Indicator 
2012 
(Actual) 
Q2 2013 
(Actual) 
First Half 
of 2013 
(Actual) 
Q3 2013 
(Predicted) 
2013 
(Predicted) 
Growth 
(%) 
Growth 
(%) 
Growth  
(%) 
Growth  
(%) 
Growth 
(%) 
GDP 7.8 7.6 7.6 7.4 7.5 
Industrial added 
value 
10.0 10.5 9.3 9.3 9.5 
Investment in 
fixed assets 
20.6 21.0 20.1 20.5 20.4 
Retail sales of 
consumer goods 
14.3 12.8 12.7 12.5 13.0 
Exports 7.9 8.0 10.4 3.0 5.5 
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Imports 4.3 10 6.7 5 6.5 
Consumer prices 2.6 3 2.4 3 3.2 
Note: 
1. The growth rate of GDP and industrial added value are calculated at comparable 
prices, and other indicators are calculated at current prices.  
2. Investment in fixed assets refers to the total investment in fixed assets. 
3. The industrial added value refers to the added value of state-owned enterprises and 
non-state-owned enterprises whose annual sales income reaches RMB 5 million. 
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